Decentralized Policing and its Effects on Dissemination and Performance of Active Shooter Response Protocols
07/12/2022
On 24 May 2022 the Uvalde Robb Elementary School massacre was perpetrated by a lone killer, where 19 children and 2 teachers were mercilessly slaughtered. The response did not follow current active shooter protocol and best practices. The Uvalde tragedy occurred 23 years and 34 days following the Columbine school shooting (April 20, 1999), where in the aftermath “active shooter response protocols” were established. Those protocols have evolved since then, but we are still Nationally suffering a great deal of inconsistency in our law enforcement response. There are numerous micro (agency specific) issues for inconsistent, less than acceptable performance, but all micro issues lead back to one macro problem. The United States historically and culturally embraces decentralized policing.
For the record, decentralized policing has many benefits and advantages for local needs and wants, but it is imperative that we recognize its challenges when disseminating guidance nationally or by state. When guidance is soft directed in language such as protocol and best practices, and it does not affect agencies daily mission, nor are there means in place to ensure full enthusiastic embracement, you can bet on tepid compliance. To illuminate the challenge, the following Washington Post article dated May 8th, 2021, by Mark Berman (Most Police departments in America are small. That’s partly why changing policing is difficult, experts say) identifies the number and sizes of independent agencies we must influence, “a federal survey in 2016 found that there are more than 12,200 local police departments nationwide, along with another 3,000 sheriff’s offices”. “Nearly half of all local police departments have fewer than 10 officers. Three in 4 of the departments have no more than two dozen officers. And 9 in 10 employ fewer than 50 sworn officers”. Add to this, all these agencies are independent and operate autonomously and you can see the uphill battle we are up against.
It is impossible to predict where and when an active shooter threat will strike, therefore it is essential to establish a consistent and competent response across all agencies. In order to achieve this median of proficiency, a centralized command influence must be established.
It is my belief that within the Emergency Management System lie our best opportunity for success. The Emergency Management System, which is set up for such incidence, may establish a State and county system of command that will develop and implement operational structure, mission orders, with commander’s intent and concept of the operation, in which all county/region agencies shall be subordinate to. All training cadre would be centrally trained and sent back to their agencies to disseminate tactical, and training doctrine. Leadership classes on command climate, mission command philosophy and commanding in such incidence would be mandatory for leadership within agencies. Regional exercises would be executed periodically.
In conclusion, establishing a central command that pushes down a standard through mission orders and mission command philosophy to facilitate the development of an agile and disciplined initiative driven officer corps is long overdue. We cannot guarantee an outcome, but we can provide an energetic, mission driven, professional, and competent response against each and every threat presented.
Improving the Active Shooter Response Training Model
In this article we identify characteristics in the current active shooter response training model. We follow up with recommended enhancements, with the objective of improving overall officer tactical competency in the full mission spectrum of patrol.
The Current Active Shooter Response Training Model
The current active shooter response training model is best described as an annual or once every 2-year specialized training event on the specific mission of active shooter response. The training is usually conducted as 1 or 2-day event. The training is usually conducted by agency or regional specialized cadre, or often tasked to SWAT elements. The general terminal learning objectives are as follows:
Definition of an active shooter event
Characteristics of shooters
Frequent targeted venues
Individual skills
Team movement (Both interior and outside)
Close quarter battle (CQB) techniques
Maneuver
Rescue task force
Force on force (Sims)
Prohibitors to Competency
The above description is generic and some agency or regional training models may have variation in frequency, some more, some less, but the general outline is typical. In the current training model, there are two tendencies that prohibit overall success in having a competent response to an active shooter incident. Below we identify those tendencies.
The first tendency is the perception that active shooter response skillsets and tasks are specialized or are exclusive to the active shooter response mission. To the contrary, all of the tasks and skillsets within the active shooter response mission are redundant throughout a patrol division’s list of essential tactical missions. When an officer displays a consistent poor level of skills proficiency during active shooter response training, it is not a far reach to expect the same tactical performance during traffic stops, high risk traffic stops, social contacts etc. Supporting collective tasks and supporting individual tasks for all patrol missions, have commonality. For instance, a basic law enforcement candidate with infantry experience, when exposed to the mission high risk traffic stop, will recognize the cover officer as an overwatch/support by fire and the offender vehicle clearing officer as the maneuver element. The concept is a common theme throughout patrol tactics, we need cover when making contact.
The second tendency is the over emphasis on force on force (sims) training. Force on force sims training is important, buts it’s only 1/3rd of the training mix. A critical element of tactical skills success is frequency in training. Frequency in training is achieved by drilling, through dry-run training. Dry run training is where tactical skills are engrained. Dry-run training is economical, saves money, and is nearly free. The only cost is time and we will get to that a little later.
The last 3rd of the training mix is live fire training/exercises (LFX). LFXs are best described as Officers exposed to buddy/team/squad concepts in live fire exercises that incorporate maneuver and communications in specific mission focused live fire lanes. The first time an officer is involved shooting, moving and communicating with fellow officers should not be in a real-world use of force incident.
A Training Model for Success
The current annual active shooter response training model provides a great deal of value. It provides context in identifying the situation, historic studies and trends, a day to 2-day emphasis on training directly on the mission and finally, realism in force on force training that tests the officer’s ability to think under pressure in dynamic and changing situations. It is near impossible to replicate realism without force on force sims training, therefore it should continue to be a part of the training model. However, it is not the start point, end point, nor the core component. The current annual training model will not achieve its full value unless the officers attending have the necessary core tactical skillsets.
The day or 2-day training model is labor and logistic heavy, therefore costly. We need to achieve the full value of the training. Officers lacking core tactical skillsets, will leave training frustrated and dread returning the next year. But most importantly, they will leave training without achieving the desired training end-state/standards.
First and foremost a system utilizing the first-line leader as the primary trainer must be established. In this system the training technique will be drill/dry-run training utilized in the rollcall/opportunity training model. In order to do this, a patrol mission list must be constructed with all supporting collective tasks and individual tasks documented. Equipped with training skills and the supporting mission training model, the leader can build core tactical skills within his squad or shift. The tasks can be executed utilizing different missions within the list of missions, but always emphasizing the relationship of tasks between missions. This type of training is the primary learning vehicle in the training model. The training support for opportunity training is small. Much of the skills could be drilled utilizing TAPE drills. Tape drills is the use of white engineer tape to outline structures or rooms.
Dry-run training engrains tactics, techniques, and procedures into the officers. It however cannot be a standalone training model. Realism must be a component in the training model. Realism is achieved by utilizing the day or 2-training model that also includes the force on force sims training. This training is conducted by your professional/specialty cadre or regional cadre.
The third and final piece of the training model is the live fire exercise (LFX) piece. This is where officers are placed in a controlled live fire range environment and learn to shoot, move and communicate in pairs, teams and squads. It is imperative that officers achieve confidence and competence in themselves, collectively and in the tactics, in order to facilitate a predictable outcome in use of force situations.
In conclusion, the above model of dry-run/drill training, active shooter response force on force training and live fire exercises, will provide agencies with competent officers in all facets of patrol operations.
Drill-Based Training
“We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, therefore, is not an act but a habit.”
-Aristotle
I happened upon the quote above, which was most fortuitous. That’s because drill-based training is the only method that will achieve competence and proficiency in law enforcement’s many physical actions required in the use of tools, tactics, techniques and procedures. In this article we will define drill and the type of tasks that should be drill based. We will also define the term action drill and relationship between individual tasks, collective tasks, and action drills. We will then outline the transition from supporting movement tasks to action drills. Finally, we will identify the trainer groups and types of training environments drill training is exploited.
Merriam-Webster defines drill as:
A: to fix something in the mind or habit pattern of by repetitive instruction.
B: to impart or communicate by repetition.
C: to train or exercise in military drill.
The reoccurring theme in the definitions above is repetitive instruction. Step by step tasks should be trained frequently to be able to execute smoothly, timely and proficiently. Drill based tasks include both individual and collective tasks (Minimum 2 officer element). We further place distinction on tasks based on movement and nonlethal tasks, and tasks utilized in potential lethal force application. We call these tasks action drills.
Action drills are derived from the US Army battle drills and are executed at the point when lethal force may be applied to control a subject(s). A bank of 10 action drills have been compiled that are terrain-based maneuver solutions during an active shooter/coordinated attack event. These drills are based on the possible delivery of lethal force, but may not always end in lethal force application. Although the 10 action drills were conceived for the purpose of active shooter response, it is also applicable in patrol missions. Collective actions performed during potential lethal force situations throughout the patrol mission spectrum are tactical doctrinally related. For example, maneuver performed during a high-risk traffic stop is based on the same tactics executed during an active shooter in open terrain, both require the employment of maneuver and support elements. Below is the definition of action drill.
Action drill is defined as:
An individual or collective action rapidly executed without application of a deliberate decision-making process, in which an officer or officers in an element apply fire and movement and maneuver to high-risk situations common to law enforcement.
Task Lists by type:
Below is a list of both individual and collective tasks that require repetitive drill training. NOTE, THE LISTS ARE NOT ALL INCLUSIVE
Individual tasks:
Handcuffing
Defensive tactics
Assess a casualty or injured subject
Hemorrhage control
Apply a dressing to an open abdominal wound
Apply a dressing to an open chest wound
Treat for shock
CPR
Don a protective mask
Hand and arm signals
Individual movement techniques (tactical)
Sidearm draw
Carbine placed into operation
Reduce a malfunction both sidearm and carbine (All types of malfunctions)
LIST IS NOT ALL INCLUSIVE
Collective Tasks:
Positioning vehicles for high risk traffic stop
Isolating a scene
Staging assets (Fire, Aid, K-9, Rotary-wing)
Post use of force scene management
Deploying less lethal team in position
Building clearing techniques (Alarms)
Control and detention of a subject or arrestee
Assemble a contact squad/element
Contact team and squad formations
Contact team and squad movement
Consolidate and reorganize
Breach an obstacle
LIST IS NOT ALL INCLUSIVE
Action Drills: (Based on the possible delivery of lethal force)
Maneuverable Open Terrain
Channelized Terrain
Breach
Hallway
Stairwell
Corner-Fed Room
Center-Fed Room
Large Room (cafeteria, gymnasiums, hangers, warehouse, etc.)
Stadium/Theater Seating
Tubular Transportation (bus or train)
The Relationship between Individual Tasks, Collective Tasks and Action Drills:
The tasks listed are modular and interrelated. Individual tasks support collective tasks and both individual and collective tasks support action drills. We address or categorize the collective task list as movements and less lethal actions. Movements are related to action drills; in that they are setting officers up for success if such an instance should occur. Action drills are the means to execute maneuver. Proper movement provides officers the tactical advantage in case maneuver is needed. This is the relationship between movement and maneuver.
Transitioning from Movement to Maneuver/Execution of the Action Drill:
The moment we see an action by a threat an analysis begins. The model often utilized for this process is called OODA; Observe, Orient, Decide, Act. In a lethal use of force instance this is internalized by the officer. If an officer is operating alone, the choices within an action drill will be limited, but are still valuable. When operating as an element of officers, the officer in the know must share the OODA information. When operating in a multiple officer element, the transition from movement to action drill is clunky and delayed. In a multiple officer setting the officer in contact must relay what he or she sees and is experiencing. This relay of information is part of “Actions on Contact”. Actions on contact serves as a pivot point to the execution of an action drill. Actions on contact alerts the element, identifies the threat, and orients the element to the threat, and subsequently adjusting the orientation of the unit to the threat.
Drill Training:
The first task prior to organizing training is to focus on what is to be trained. This requires a top down review. This is called “Mission Focused” training. Mission focused training identifies the tactical missions that the agency’s patrol section or division are required to perform, the collective tasks that support them and the individual tasks that support the collective tasks. The mission list is called the Mission Essential Task List, METL (pronounced METAL). This allows agencies to identify the key tasks to overall mission success and to focus on those tasks.
Once tasks are identified, conditions and standards must be listed in-order to establish performance measures. In the previously posted article “Better Trained Officers Through Organizational Training Structure”, we spoke about the three levels of training; Leader informal training, through rollcall, opportunity and concurrent training, Formal training through agency instructor cadre, and regional joint training exercises. These three levels of training provide the organizational infrastructure to train tasks, missions and to conduct exercises to evaluate performance, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The structure outlined above enables agencies to train on individual and collective tasks informally during duty with little cost. It allows agency instructor cadre to group/bunch tasks in-order to develop modular exercise lanes to evaluate small units. It facilitates multi-echelon exercises at the regional level, where small unit performance is easily measured due to standardized performance measures that are in place.
In conclusion, drill based training, organized from regimented and standard based task lists and exercised at all three levels of training (leader informal, agency formal and regional exercises) will provide the frequency in training needed to facilitate the fielding of a professional and competent force.
Better Trained Officers and Teams Through Organizational Training Structure
in this article we explore how law enforcement organizational structure and the establishment of a tiered instructional format can facilitate individual and collective competency in the execution of patrol duties.
The Importance of Training Frequency
Training Frequency is a key component in law enforcement tactical and use of force training. In patrol duties, missions such as traffic stop, social contact and traffic control are performed regularly during the duty day or week. A high frequency of correct repetitions, builds a level of proficiency in these reoccurring missions. Use of force execution during these frequent patrol missions are infrequent and therefore must be addressed during training. For most law enforcement agencies within the United States, tactical and use of force training lacks frequency. Without adequate repetitions and shorter gaps between training sessions, officers will not develop the skills to analyze and identify the potential for deteriorating situations, which is a key component in developing de-escalation skills. Officers performance without frequent training in use of force recognition and application maybe scattershot. The perfect outcome in training officers in use of force is to produce predictable competent judgement in moments of high risk and stress. The lack of frequency in training on high risk/low frequency events creates uneven results during the execution of duties. The uneven performance creates trust and confidence issues within the citizenry and government officials. There are organizational changes to leader duties and responsibilities and changes to how we define and categorize trainers that will facilitate frequency in training without impacting the budget.
What Defines a Trainer
Its understandable that law enforcement training is treated in a litigious manner, so it is sensible that certified instructors are established and maintained to manage and disseminate proper doctrine within their specific disciplines. This however does not preclude utilizing experienced officers and all patrol leaders within the agency as Trainers. Trainer qualifications are based on their performance and competence. The level at which these Trainers instruct is at the informal level of training. This type of instruction would occur during briefing/roll-call, opportunity and concurrent training (Example of concurrent training: Informal training conducted between formal training stations at a range).
Leaders are Trainers
Establishing focused and purposeful training is the goal. A training concept that has proven successful and has served the United States Army well in maintaining focus and purpose, are the 7 Principles of Training, noted below in an adapted form for law enforcement:
Administrators and other leaders are responsible for training.
First-line leaders are overall responsible for the technical and tactical proficiency of their team or shift.
Train as you patrol or operate.
Train to standard.
Train to sustain.
Conduct multi-echelon and concurrent training.
Train to develop agile leaders and organizations
The 2nd principle of training, “first-line leaders are overall responsible for the technical and tactical proficiency of their team or shift”, is the foundation for establishing proficiency and competency in their individual officers. But more importantly, this expanse in the duties and responsibilities of the first-line leader, creates a more cohesive, coordinated and professional delivery of collective policing.
The benefits of empowering the first-line leader as the primary trainer of their subordinates:
Leaders will become intimate with their subordinate officers’ strengths and shortcomings.
Subordinates will become intimate with the strengths and shortcomings of their leader.
Collective tasks will be trained as a team.
Concepts can be developed, planned and rehearsed so as to improve the coordination of collective actions for when they occur during patrol.
Cohesive teams will result from shared collective problem solving.
Builds current and future leaders.
First-line leaders do not eliminate the need for instructor qualified subject matter experts, they improve delivery and training relevancy. The first-line leader is a vessel to create frequency in training and to remove the training relevancy gap, by developing team concepts to utilize learned skills on duty.
Transitioning to a system in which the first-line leader is a trainer will require a rewrite of duties and responsibilities. It will also require instructor development for all first-line leaders. Finally, it will require a philosophical assessment of attributes needed to be a leader, in order to cultivate and select from the pool of potential future leaders.
Organizing and Categorizing Training
Training is either formal or informal. Training conducted by the first-line leader is of the informal variety. Training conducted by agency tactical instructors, is formal in nature. During formal training officers should train as a shift/squad to include the leaders. This allows for the conduct of informal training between stations (concurrent training). The instructors coordinate with the small unit leaders so as to train on specific individual tasks and collective tasks that support the mission the instructor group is training. Formal training should be conducted to support labor and logistically intensive training events.
First-line leader instruction:
Informal
During rollcall/briefing and opportunity training.
Individual skill tasks.
Collective skill tasks that support the Mission Essential Task List such as Traffic Stop; Social Contact; Domestic Dispute; Alarm/burglary; High risk traffic stop; Active shooter response etc.
Conducting “Conducting concept of the operation” briefings, to include back-briefs on Mission Essential Task List missions (During rollcall/briefing and opportunity training).
Formal Training:
Tactical training to include Live Fire Exercises (LFX) and force on force.
Individual firearms skills.
Collective firearms skills (See LFX above).
Specialties such as combatives; assigned weapons and tools; etc.
All formal instructors and first-line leaders should be firearm and force on force instructor qualified. This has multiple purposes. First, have all instructors and trainers’ firearm and force on force instructor qualified facilitates safe training. Secondly, coordination between leaders and formal instructors is smoother, since everyone is school trained. Lastly, logistically it is easier to support ranges for qualifications and training when you have a large pool of instructors. On the subject of firearms training, firearms qualification is not training, it is certification. Firearms qualifications should be scheduled for just before, during or just after duty. It should be conducted in such a way as to minimize costs.
Regional Training:
Regional training should be in the form of joint exercises within context of large mass casualty, or events that require mutual aid from neighboring agencies. Exercises can include but are not exclusive to:
Active shooter events
Coordinated terror attacks
Civil disturbance
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornados, fires, floods, earthquakes, etc.
All agency formal instructors should be utilized as Regional instructors on such missions as noted above and should be trained at a central location such as the Criminal Justice Training Center. This provides continuity of training and standards throughout the region. This will enhance and facilitate joint operations.
The above tri-level training technique will ensure uniformed tactics, techniques and procedures, and standard of performance throughout the region. This will allow agencies to measure its officers to other agency officers and evaluate the standing within the region.
In closing, the above methods will require an embracement of changes in structure, philosophy and training techniques. It is a plan that will take time to fully come to fruition. If embraced it will provide competency at the individual level and establish continuity of procedures, standards and performance at the regional level.
Command Influence on Officer Initiative and Decisiveness
An article, (“Sergeant fired for inaction while kids were slaughtered in Parkland rehired with backup pay”) was posted on LinkedIn and drew many responses from LinkedIn members. The article was about a Sgt, who was fired over the lack of response to the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Shooting, was now being reinstated with full back pay and seniority intact. In short, the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO) had been found to have violated the Sergeant's Constitutional due process rights and improperly terminated him. The majority of the responses focused on the key figure, the disgraced Sgt. I posted a response to address the misplaced focus of attention on the Sgt. “We are putting the cart before the horse. The lack of action was a regional failure. That’s a leadership issue. Agencies are responsible for hiring, training, guidance and inspiration. Lack of initiative appears have been an institutionally induced condition”. This article attempts to explain what I was commenting on in the short LinkedIn response.
The Sergeant’s lack of response and the ineffectiveness of the entire BCSO was due to an absence of the agency’s leadership. The absence of mission command, dissemination of a command’s intent, and clear end-state goals/criteria for success, is the main culprit in US law enforcement failures, in situations we can deem as highly dynamic. No amount of disciplinary action, though it has its place, can overcome hiring practices that do not consider character traits needed in situations outside the norm in an officer’s day to day duties. Nor can disciplinary action, encourage initiative, free thinking and problem solving in critical, high stress situations, when an agency’s culture is void of and discourages such characteristics.
Command Posture can either encourage or discourage initiative. A healthy command posture in which officers are enabled to problem-solve, decision make and execute actions in confidence results in good outcomes. Hiring criteria, individual officer technical/tactical proficiency, through training management and officer initiative and decision-making development are key components in developing competent responders.
Command emphasis on hiring officers with:
· Integrity
· Motivation
· Selflessness
· Humility
· Empathy
· Trust
· Life Experience
Command emphasis on officer proficiency in:
· Marksmanship, to include shoot no shoot situations and tactical Live Fire Exercises.
· Criminal law and use of force policies.
· Trauma medical care.
· Physical fitness.
· De-escalation training and tactics.
Command emphasis on cultivating officer:
· Initiative in all situations, but especially under pressure where command directives are not readily available.
· Community policing, building officer trust in community and community trust in officers.
· Confidence in situational weapon employment (un-holstering or placing carbine into action) in reasonable and suitable situations.
An agency’s command must also Action Plan for active shooter situations. The command must publish its Intent. Establishing command intent in an active shooter/coordinated attack is a logical step in detailing what the command expects from officers in such situations and what the criteria for success looks like. The desired end-state is the same for all missions, whether an officer is conducting school zone speed enforcement or neutralizing an active shooter. The chief’s and commander’s intended end-state is Preserving Life. The purpose of stating the end state (Preserving Life) is to always keep officers’ objective driven. If orders are lacking or communication from higher is broken, then officers always fall back to the end state, Preserving Life. Neutralization of the threat and conducting rescue task force operations are all in the effort of preserving life.
Intent is further detailed by breaking down phases of the operation and a checklist of objectives that are criteria for success for each of the phases. The phases are:
· Neutralization of Threat
· Rescue Task Force operations
· Clearing operations
· Evacuation operations
The command further details to agency officers’ expectations by presenting a concept of the operation which outlines how the command sees such an event unfolding. This allows the officers vision of the command’s expectations and is an important component in guiding and facilitating officer initiative and decision making in a dynamic and everchanging environment.
The bottom line. Officer performance is not just an individual responsibility, it is a collective one, and the agency command culture will have either a positive or negative affect on it.